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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

]i

Case No.

900559-CA

Classification Priority 2

vs.
DONALD WAYNE GAMBREL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) (1990).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction following a jury trial
on an Information charging the defendant with three (3) counts of
Negligent Homicide.

The defendant was sentenced to serve three

(3) consecutive one-year terms in the Iron County Jail, one year
to be served for each count of Negligent Homicide.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly sentence the defendant to

three (3) consecutive one-year sentences?
Pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
lower court's ruling shall not be set aside unless it is clearly
erroneous.
2.
Attorney

Did the trial court properly rule that the Iron County
posted

the

requisite

bond

upon

taking

office

or,

alternatively, was acting as the de facto Iron County Attorney?
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Pursuant

to Rule

52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the

lower court's ruling shall not be set aside unless it is clearly
erroneous.
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Utah R. Civ. P. 52:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
Utah Code Ann. §17-16-11 (1990):
The Board of County Commissioners shall
prescribe by ordinance the amount in which
the following county and precinct officers
shall execute official bonds before entering
upon the discharge of the duties of their
respective
offices, viz.: county
clerk,
county auditor, sheriff, county attorney,
county recorder, county assessor, county
surveyor, justice court judge, and constable,
and the Board may by ordinance require any
deputy or assistant of any such officer to
execute an official bond before entering upon
the discharge of the duties of his office.
Utah Code Ann. §52-2-1 (1990):
Whenever
any person duly
elected
or
appointed to any office of the state or any
of its political subdivisions, fails to
qualify for any such office within sixty days
after the date of beginning of the term of
office for which he was elected or appointed,
such office shall thereupon become vacant and
shall be filled as provided by law. Whenever
the bond of any officer of the state or of
any
of
its
political
subdivisions
is
cancelled, revoked, annulled or otherwise
becomes void or of no effect, without another
proper bond being given so that continuance
of bonded protection is afforded, the office
of such officer shall thereupon become vacant
and shall be filled as provided by law. Any
elected or appointed official who has failed
on the effective date of the act to qualify
for the position to which he was elected or
- 2-

appointed, shall be deemed to come within the
provisions of this act, and the office of
such officer shall become vacant at the end
of forty days after the effective date of
this act unless legal bond is given before
the expiration of such period, and such
office shall be filled as provided by law.
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(1) (1990):
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall
establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of
this code, the act shall be punishable under
only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such
provision bars a prosecution under any other
such provision.
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(1) (1990):
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement
and includes speech.
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1990):
With criminal negligence or is criminally
negligent with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the failure to perceive constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise in all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-104 (1990):
Conduct is an offense if a person engages
in it with criminal negligence. Conduct is
also an offense if a person engages in it
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
Conduct is an offense if a person engages in
it recklessly, the conduct is an offense also
if a person engages in it intentionally or
knowingly. Conduct is an offense if a person
engages in it knowingly, the conduct is an

- 3-

offense also if
intentionally.

a

person

engages

in

it

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1,3,9) (1990):
A court shall determine, if a defendant
has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent
or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
Sentences
for
state
offenses
shall
concurrently unless the court states in the
sentence that they shall run consecutively.
A court may impose consecutive sentences
for offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
This section may not be construed to limit
the
authority
of
a
court
to
impose
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1990):
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal
negligence, causes the death of another.
Negligent
misdemeanor.

homicide

is

a

class

A

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

State

of

Utah

hereby

adopts

defendant's

general

statement of the case with the following additional and relevant
facts, to wit:
FLATLANDER RIG
Defendant Donald Wayne Gambrel was driving a 1987 Kenworth
tractor diesel and pulling a 1988 Lufkin trailer (eighteen-wheel
rig) with nine (9) gears and no jake brake, said configuration
commonly referred to as a "flatlander rig" meaning that the
tractor and trailer are primarily used in flat country and thus
no

need

for

additional

gears

or

a

jake

brake.

(T. 52-56)

Moreover, the defendant's

trailer was carrying

seventy-eight

thousand (78,000) pounds of steel ingots. (T. 58)
DEFECTIVE BRAKES
The defendant did not know how to adjust the brakes on his
diesel

tractor

and trailer

and he had not, in any manner,

adjusted his brakes from the time he left Tennessee until the
fatal crash in southern Utah. (T. 233-235)

Utah Highway Patrol

Trooper Kirk B. Harding, who testified at trial as an expert
witness, stated that

(a) he had been a Utah Highway Patrol

trooper for twenty-one years, a truck driver for thirty years,
and

had

investigated

literally

hundreds

of

accidents

as a

commercial vehicle safety officer (T. 116-119), (b) he was able
to observe and test six (6) of the brakes from the tractor and
trailer that were able to be tested after the accident and that
none

of

the

brakes

tested

met

state

or

federal

minimum

requirements (T. 126), and (c) at the time of the accident, and
under the conditions at the time of the accident, the defendant
had no potential to stop. (T. 129)
SPEED AND ROAD CONDITIONS
On August 20, 1989, at 3:38 p.m., the head-on collision
between the defendant's diesel and tractor and a passenger car
occurred at mile post 13, Highway U-14, at the "S" curve (T. 45)
on a very steep grade (T. 89) therein causing the death of Robert
Griffin

(age 37), Neoma Baldwin (age 30) , and Colette Griffin

(age 16) (T. 47) who were traveling up Highway U-14, eastbound,
in a gray and black 1983 Ford LTD 4-door vehicle. (T. 51)

- 5-

The

defendant

admitted

that,

just

prior

to

the

head-on

collision, he was traveling at approximately sixty (60) to sixtyfive (65) miles per hour. (T. 240)

Neil Adams testified that he

was traveling with his family toward Cedar City with a sick child
and made several attempts, over U-14, to pass the defendant's
vehicle but could not get around the defendant's diesel tractor
and trailer. (T. 150-156)

Mr. Adams further testified that the

defendant's diesel tractor and trailer, on Webster's Flat and
just

before the downgrade and the accident, was traveling at

speeds

of

eighty

(80)

to

eighty-five

(85)

miles

per

hour.

(T. 157)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The defendant was charged with three (3) counts of Negligent
Homicide, convicted at jury trial on December 14, 1989, of all
three (3) counts, was located in Memphis, Tennessee after having
failed to appear for sentencing or cooperate with the Presentence
Investigation Report and extradited back to the State of Utah
where he was sentenced on October 3, 1990, to one (1) year in the
Iron

County

Jail

on

each

count,

the

sentences

to

run

consecutively, one to follow the other.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court had the authority to sentence the defendant
to

one

(1) year

in

the

Iron

County

Jail

on

each

count

of

Negligent Homicide, the sentences to run consecutively, one to
follow the other.
The trial court had jurisdiction to try this defendant as
the Iron County Attorney did, in fact, post a bond upon taking
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office and, alternatively, was serving as the de facto County
Attorney.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED PROPER AUTHORITY IN
SENTENCING THE DEPENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES.
Defendant

appeals

from

the

sentence

imposed

after

his

conviction of three (3) counts of Negligent Homicide as defined
in Utah

Code Ann. §76-5-206

(1990) and §76-2-103(4)

(1990).

Specifically, the Fifth Circuit Court in and for Iron County,
State of Utah, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(1) (1990)
and

Utah

Code

Ann. §76-3-401(1,3,9)

(1990),

sentenced

the

defendant to one (1) year in the Iron County Jail for each count
and

ordered

that

the

sentences

run

consecutively

therein

effectively sentencing the defendant to three (3) years in the
Iron County Jail.
consecutive

Defendant-Appellant argues in his brief that

sentences are not appropriate as the defendant's

"act" was not a voluntary act but, rather, an "omission" and
therefore the court's authority to impose consecutive sentences
is precluded.
In the case of State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. ,
1989), this court ruled that the intentional act of firing a
firearm

which

harmed

appropriately

result

sentences.

The

intentional acts of

in

State

two

(2)

different

consecutive
would

argue

rather
that

victims
than
the

could

concurrent
defendant's

(a) driving a flatlander rig with 78,000

pounds of steel over mountainous terrain, (b) without properly

- 7 -

adjusted brakes, and (c) traveling in excess of 80 miles per hour
across the top of the mountain just prior to a steep downgrade
and "S" turns would, in fact, involve an intentional act that
would very foreseeably lead to the injury or death of multiple
victims.
As referenced in the defendant's brief, the Utah Supreme
Court stated in State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 (Utah 1981), that "a
defendant who commits an act of violence with the intent to harm
more than one person or by means likely to cause harm to more
than several persons is more culpable than a defendant that harms
only one person."

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(1) (1990) defines

"act" as a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.

Utah

Code Ann. §76-2-104 (1990) provides that conduct is an offense if
a person engages in it with criminal negligence.

The State would

argue that this defendant clearly engaged in a criminal act and
criminal conduct that resulted in the death of three (3) people
and under statutory authority, as well as case law, the lower
court had the authority to impose consecutive

sentences for

offenses arising out of a single criminal episode.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT HAD STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO
SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT AS THE IRON COUNTY
ATTORNEY
POSTED THE REQUIRED BOND OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, WAS SERVING AS THE DE FACTO
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY.
The Iron County Attorney, together with other elected county
officials,

is required

to

"execute an official

bond

before

entering upon the discharge of the duties of their respective
offices," Utah Code Ann. §17-16-11 (1990).
- 8-

Upon entering office

as Iron County Attorney, Scott M. Burns made certain that he had
executed an official bond pursuant to the requirement of the
above-stated statute by determining that Western Surety Company,
by blanket policy, covered the bond of the Iron County Attorney*
(R. 46-55)
Defendant argues that the Iron County Attorney has not filed
a bond, is not covered by insurance, and therefore cannot act as
the duly elected Iron County Attorney, and thus the trial court
was without jurisdiction to try this case.
argument

in

another

case

and

relating

to

Upon hearing this
the

Kane

County

Attorney, the Iron County Clerk obtained an opinion from Western
Surety

Company

as to whether or not elected

officials were

covered in Iron County under the blanket policy, and specifically
under a public employee's blanket bond, and the vice-president
and corporal counsel of Western Surety Company assured the Iron
County Clerk that all elected officials are covered under the
bond. (R. 46-55)
Assuming, arguendo, that the blanket bond did not meet
statutory requirements, Plaintiff-Respondent argues that in the
unpublished memorandum decision of George W. Elwood v. Tamara
Holden, Warden, Utah State Prison, Case No. 890609-CA (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), this court cited Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 130
(Utah 1983) for the proposition that "an officer de facto is one
who claims and assumes official authority, is reputed to have it,
and the community acquiesces accordingly."

In the Elwood case, a

deputy county attorney prosecuted a case having previously failed
to file an oath of office as required and this court, citing

_9 _

Vance, affirmed a denial of the petitioner's Writ of Habeas
Corpus, holding that the deputy county attorney was acting as a
de facto officer and thus there was no basis for reversal of the
petitioner's convictions*
In the case at bar, and arguably
officer's

failure to

not as severe as an

file an oath of office, the defendant

"alleges" that the bond obtained by the Iron County Attorney was
not an appropriate bond.

While the State asserts that the bond

was appropriate, there can be no doubt, even if the court finds
that the bond was not appropriate, that Iron County Attorney
Scott M. Burns was acting de facto.

Specifically, there can be

no argument that County Attorney Burns claimed and assumed to
exercise official authority, was reputed to have it, and the
community acquiesced

in that authority.

Finally, and

in an

overabundance of caution, and in the unlikely event a credible
challenge was made that Scott M. Burns failed to file a proper
bond and the office of Iron County Attorney was left vacant as
set forth in Utah Code Ann.

§52-2-1 (1990) , the Board of Iron

County Commissioners appointed Scott M. Burns as Iron County
Attorney, nunc pro tunc, from and after January 5, 1987, and for
the period to December 31, 1990, and bestowed upon said Scott M.
Burns

all

powers, authorities, and

obligations

of

the duly

elected Iron County Attorney during said time periods and the
Board of Iron County Commissioners specifically resolved that
Scott M. Burns was the Iron County Attorney, de jure or de facto,
from and after January 5, 1987, to the date of December 31, 1990
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(the conclusion of the County Attorney's four- [4-] year term).
(R. 46-55)
The Plaintiff-Respondent takes the position, in agreement
with the trial court's ruling of March 30, 1990 (R. 46-55), that
the Elwood and Vance cases are dispositive of this issue before
the court and an appropriate ruling would be that (a) the bond
obtained

by

Iron

County

Attorney

Scott

M.

Burns

was

an

appropriate bond but (b) even if the bond was not appropriate,
Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns was acting de facto under the
law and thus there is not a justifiable basis to find that the
trial court did not have statutory authority to sentence the
defendant to consecutive misdemeanor jail terms.
CONCLUSION
The
asserts

State

of

that the

Utah,

trial

Plaintiff-Respondent,

court exercised

respectively

proper

authority

in

sentencing the defendant to consecutive terms in the Iron County
Jail, and the trial court had jurisdiction to try this case as
the Iron County Attorney was properly covered by a bond or,
alternatively, was acting as a de facto officer.

Based upon the

foregoing, the State of Utah respectively requests that this
court affirm the Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment of the Fifth
Circuit Court in and for Iron County, State of Utah.
DATED this

($&

day of February, 1991.

SCOTT M. BURNS
Iron County Attorney
for Respondent State of Utah
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